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We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters,
inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to
the competing social forces of conformity and dissent. Our understanding of the spatiotemporally
complex population dynamics is informed by a system of nonlinear replicator equations, discrete
deterministic cousin of the original stochastic Seceder Model.
Fragmentation, dispersal & coalescence are crucial
processes in a multitude of highly correlated, dynami-
cally complex many-body systems, particularly those far
from equilibrium where stochasticity, symmetry, and self-
organization can conspire to generate rich pattern for-
mation phenomena [1]. Natural examples abound- the
rings of Saturn, its Cassini and lesser divisions, consist
of a gravitationally bound myriad of ever-colliding rocky
chucks, macroscopically stable within an intricately de-
tailed set of circular bands [2]. Alternatively, consider the
coat of the leopard, zebra, or giraffe- each a glorious prod-
uct of competing reaction-diffusion biochemistry [3]. In
these instances, the dynamical forces are physiochemical
in nature, but movement can be inspired by equally com-
pelling, though fundamentally different mechanisms, es-
pecially in biological, economic and sociological contexts.
Visual/verbal cues (i.e., information propagation) within
a school of fish [4] or flock of birds [5] lead to dynamic
domain formation & destruction. Volatile populations of
informed, interacting stock market traders can condense,
exhibiting herd-like behavior [6]. Rich stochastic dynam-
ics, as well as phase transition phenomena, are evident
in various evolutionary minority (e.g., El Farol Bar) [7],
public-goods [8], and other societal selection games, such
as the Seceder Model [9,10], which introduces a novel
dynamical frustration via competing tendencies of being
distinct, yet part of the group. Here, we consider the se-
ceder mechanism within an evolving political populace,
uncovering an interwoven set of strange attractors whose
reign is governed by kinetic symmetry-breaking within an
ideological plane. We find that the conflicting tendencies
toward conformity and dissent yield rich spatiotempo-
ral party population dynamics. The seceder Catch-22
is that dissenting parties provide alternatives, but fre-
quently grow in popularity themselves, inevitably suffer-
ing rebellion from within. Clearly, these simple models
are not intended to capture all important features; the
goal, however, is to gain appreciation of robust, univer-
sal aspects, as was done, e.g., for Ising systems in the
case of ferromagnetic, liquid-gas, and binary alloy criti-
cal phenomena [11], or quadratic maps & Lotka-Volterra
coupled ODEs, in the matter of chaotic dynamics [12].
For ease of presentation, we discuss the illustrative case
of 3-party dynamics driven by a triplet-selection mech-
anism; i.e., voters poll three individuals to inform their
political decision. We are lead, initially, to study the
fixed points (FPs) associated with the following set of
symmetry-broken replicator equations [9,10,13]:
R˙ = R3 + 3R(G2 +B2) + αRGB −R
G˙ = G3 + 3G(R2 +B2) + βRGB −G
B˙ = B3 + 3B(R2 +G2) + γRGB −B
where R,G,&B ≤ 1 represent the relative populations
of the three parties, Red, Green & Black, while proba-
bility conservation demands α+β+γ=6. The rate vari-
ables are dictated by the competing tendencies of, resp.,
homogeneity, distinction, and the democratic dilemma-
equal representation of the three parties. More specifi-
cally, the purely cubic term results when the triplet selec-
tion group has uniform representation of one party; the
decision maker switches to (or remains in, as the case may
be...) that party. In the event that the polled group has
an unequal distribution; i.e., a minority party, outnum-
bered 2 to 1, the underdog triumphs- thus, the seceder
linear-quadratic terms. Finally, the trilinear contribu-
tions arise when the opinion group has one individual
from each of the three parties. We consider successive
levels of symmetry breaking- first, if α=β, we have ef-
fectively, an isosceles geometry, R & G are equivalent
in their relation to B and we find the following popu-
lation FPs: (R,G,B) = (1
2
, 1
2
, 0) and ( 2
8−α
, 2
8−α
, 4−α
8−α
).
For α < 4, the 3-party solution is stable, 2-party dynam-
ics unstable; for α ≥ 4 vice versa. Single party dom-
ination, e.g., (0, 0, 1), is never stable. Clearly, α = 2
would represent a fully symmetrized situation with the
three groups equidistant from each other, an equilateral
(EQ) arrangement with evenly distributed populations
(1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
). By contrast, α = 3 corresponds to the standard
Seceder Model in one dimension [9], with the odd party,
B, poised at the midpoint of the line segment connecting
ideologically opposed groups, R & G, at the ends; in this
case, the stable population FP is the familiar (2
5
, 2
5
, 1
5
). In
fact, any short isosceles (SI) triangle arrangement of the
parties, with sides RG>RB=GB, is drawn to a chaotic
orbit about that fixed point; see later. Alternatively,
the geometric arrangement could be tall isosceles (TI),
with RG<RB=GB, so that there is effectively a remote
party equidistant from the others; here, connection to the
stochastic Seceder Model suggests α=0; the dynamical
1
FIG. 1. Phase diagram of the broken-symmetry replicator
equations for 3-party dynamics.
flows are drawn to the attractor (1
4
, 1
2
, 1
4
). We reveal, in
Figure 1, the full phase-diagram of this nonlinear repli-
cator system in the αβ-plane, relaxing the isoscelean ge-
ometric constraint. Surprisingly, a stable 3-party dy-
namic persists for quite a range of parameter values,
occupying the triangular region bounded by the lines
α = −2, β = −2, α + β = 8 (i.e., γ = −2). The unique,
full symmetry EQ FP, (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
), shown as a red diamond
at the point α = β = γ = 2, is surrounded by a trio of
permutation-related TI (SI) FPs, indicated by blue cir-
cles (green squares). Oddly enough, 3-party politics ex-
ists even for modestly negative values of α, β, or γ; i.e.,
explicit biasing against a particular party. For sufficiently
great forcing, however, the dynamics switches from 3 to
2-party politics; e.g., with γ < −2, all flows are driven to
the same (R,G,B) = (1
2
, 1
2
, 0) FP, with a 50-50 split in
the population between the two surviving parties. Along
special lines of symmetry, such as α = β < −2, there is,
numerically, a first-order coexistence between competing
relevant 2-party FPs; in the mentioned instance, (0, 1
2
, 1
2
)
and (1
2
, 0, 1
2
). All this is in strong contrast to the 3-party
region of the phase diagram, where there is a unique FP
associated with each choice of αβγ values.
Having investigated the role of symmetry-breaking
within the context of the well-mixed, deterministic repli-
cator equations, we now explore its manifestation for
a related spatially-extended, stochastic model in which,
one might imagine, voters occupy specific positions in a
2D ideological plane, with axes corresponding to a pair
of compelling political issues, e.g., taxation and inter-
national cooperation, running the gamut from extreme
leftist to ultra-right wing conservative positions. We’ll
see shortly that for this stochastic Seceder Model, ki-
netic symmetry breaking (KSB) arises in an entirely in-
trinsic manner via fluctuations built-up in this far-from-
equilibrium system. We make long-time runs, t=5x105
generations, with substantial population sizes, N=103,
running simulations in 2d with the entire population ini-
tialized in a single party at the origin. As discovered pre-
viously [10], the population rapidly fragments and dis-
perses but within a thousand generations coalesces into
three divergent groups, heading radially away from the
origin at a slightly sublinear speed [14] with equally-sized
FIG. 2. a) Green, Red, & Black Party membership fluc-
tuations over a half million generations, and b) magnified
view of a particularly busy 30000 generation time interval,
t = 75 − 105x103, when the population circulates about EQ,
SI, TI FPs. Also shown are the pairwise separations (blue)
and party radial distances, in the latter instance w/ epony-
mous traces.
party populations. In fact, if one carefully monitors party
membership over time, there are impressive fluctuations
about (as well as away from!) the neighborhood of this
dynamical (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) EQ FP. In Figure 2a, we show the
entire time series for the three parties- here indicated
by the colors red, green and black. We see immediately
that for much of t < 1x105, the average party popula-
tion is indeed N/3 but in due course, one of the parties,
in this case the Greens @t≈78000, suffers a severe drop
in membership, suddenly falling to 200; simultaneously,
the Red and Black Parties rise, fluctuating about a mean
of 400. In Figure 2b, we show an expanded detail of
the subsequent, especially active epoch. Apparently, the
political system has dynamically migrated to a chaotic
stay about the (2
5
, 1
5
, 2
5
) SI FP, where two parties, Red
& Black, equally dominate the third, Green. This state
of affairs persists until t≈91000, when a second abrupt
dynamical transition occurs- this time to the (1
2
, 1
4
, 1
4
)
TI FP, in which there is a single popular party, here
the Reds, with twice the membership of two equal mi-
nority parties, Black and Green. Finally, just beyond
t=100000, the system reverts to the original, unique EQ
2
FP. Overlays to Figure 2b reveal relevant geometric as-
pects, including evolution of various pairwise separations
between parties (blue), as well as radial distances from
the origin (party colors). We notice, for example, when
the Green Party membership plummets, the party actu-
ally suffers a stochastic stall (green trace plateaus...), its
radial motion ceasing as population redistribution takes
place. The SI→TI transition is always marked by the
simultaneous stall of all three parties (red, green, and
black traces all horizontal), while the triangular geom-
etry switches to one short and two (nearly) equal long
sides. The return the EQ FP for t>100000 is, of course,
temporary- see, again, Figure 2a. Note, in particular, the
rather long run, t=2.5-3.9x105, during which the political
dynamic is controlled by the (2
5
, 2
5
, 1
5
) SI FP, though even
that impressive interlude is punctuated by intermittent,
though typically short-lived (≈ 1-2000 generations) TI
episodes, three of which are clearly visible in the figure.
It is informative to study the time evolution of the
party populations from the vantage point of a Poincare
type section; we show in Figure 3 the fractional pop-
ulations of the Black and Red Parties for the entirety
of the original simulation. For the time interval t=2.0-
4.0x105, an epoch strongly dominated, recall Figure 2a,
by the (R,G,B) = (2
5
, 2
5
, 1
5
) FP, indicated by leftmost
green square, a symbol shared by its SI FP permuted
cousins. As previously, the TI FPs are shown by blue
circles, and the solitary, but evenly distributed, EQ FP
is the red diamond. The time interval was chosen specif-
ically to show governing role of a particular SI FP, which
gives rise to a compelling crescent-shaped feature in the
Poincare trace. Note, especially, the position of com-
plementary blue TI FPs in the wings of the crescent,
which faithfully track the relatively less frequent excur-
sions of the system to states in which a single majority
party strongly dominates the political dynamics; here,
Red or Green Parties with memberships in the neighbor-
hood of 500- in such instances, the Black Party moves
up momentarily to 250. It is apparent that the inter-
val t=2.0-2.4x105 is responsible for the faint black cloud
centered about the EQ FP, complementary to the solid
crescent. For the given interval, the system spends little
time with either the Green or Red Parties in the weak
minority, so those sections of the Poincare plot are rather
sparse, but in the infinite time limit, or even if one con-
siders the full 1/2 million generations implicit in Figure
2a, the Poincare section (black and gray dots taken to-
gether) has an easily perceived elliptical form resulting
from the superposition of three symmetrically permuted
cusps pinned at each of the green square, SI FPs. In this
way, wings overlap, where the crescents share a common,
blue circle TI FP. Of course, this ellipse (or ellipsoid, in
the full 3d plot with (R,G,B) on the three axes...), does
not have a sharp boundary, though the fall-off is rather
rapid. The soft asymptotic ellipse, as well as the short-
FIG. 3. Poincare section tracks the system through succes-
sive generations, plotting the population fractions claimed by
two of the three parties. The black dots correspond to the
time interval t=2.0-4.0x105 during most of which the Reds
and Greens share power, with Black Party in solitary minor-
ity and, aside from brief intermittent excursions elsewhere,
the dynamics are controlled by the SI FP ( 2
5
, 2
5
, 1
5
)- see Figure
2a. Note the black crescent-shaped region, with tips overlap-
ping neighboring TI FPs in blue. The gray dots record the
system in the complementary time interval of the half mil-
lion generation simulation. Together, black and grey yield a
very particular elliptical geometry, which along with the cres-
cent, are the characteristic features Seceder Model Poincare
section.
timescale crescent constitute the signature details of the
Seceder Model Poincare section.
We can decipher these matters a bit by studying the
party membership PDFs, obtained by isolating intervals
of time in which a single FP dominates the dynamics.
In Figure 4, the population PDFs associated with the
EQ, SI, TI attractors are shown, resp., in red, green,
and blue. We construct the red (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) EQ PDF by
sampling over some 200000 noncontiguous generations,
primarily t<80000 and t>420000 and find three over-
lapped, essentially identical, asymmetric, nongaussian,
skewed distributions, peaked near N/3=333, low slung
with very substantial widths. By contrast, focussing on
the 150000 generation interval commencing at t=240000,
where (2
5
, 2
5
, 1
5
) FP reigns, we uncover the membership
PDF associated with the green SI FP. Clearly a differ-
ent beast altogether, it is bimodal, with 2 superposed,
short, but broad components (mean@400), long tails on
the low side- still substantial even at 250, and a single
sharp, nearly symmetric peak centered at 200, consider-
ably narrower, with rather small probability to rise above
250 or fall below 150. These features, esp. the latter, are
evident in the crescent boundaries of Figure 3. Finally,
the TI PDF, in blue, also bimodal, is characterized by a
very narrow peak for the solitary majority party @500,
3
FIG. 4. Seceder SI, EQ, TI FP party membership PDFs.
and two identical overlapped broader contributions with
mean at 250 for the equal pair of minority parties. The
nature of the various tails, as well as the mixed popu-
lation size, go far in explaining why certain dynamical
transitions, such as EQ→SI or SI→TI, are considerably
more common than others; e.g., the system rarely tunnels
EQ→TI. We seek a deeper understanding of the transi-
tion probabilities associated with these important global
shifts in the population dynamics and have taken a step
in this direction, studying the decay modes and lifetime
distribution of an initial EQ state- see Figure 5. We dis-
cover that the branching ratio is highly biased in favor
of the EQ→SI decay route; indeed, 97.6%(2.4%) of the
time the transition is to the SI(TI) attractor.
Interestingly, the essential aspects of KSB can be an-
alyzed via the replicator equations; in particular, we
consider the case of d + 1 symmetrically arrayed par-
ties in d dimensional space (i.e, 2D equilateral trian-
gle, 3D tetrahedron, etc.) and examine what happens
if a single party, with fractional membership z, let’s say,
kinetically breaks the symmetry, moving closer/farther
from the remaining parties, each of whom possess equal
membership x = (1 − z)/d. For this characteristic situ-
ation, the rate equation for the anomalous party reads:
z˙ = z3 + 3dz(1 + δ(d − 1))x2 − z, where the symmetry-
breaking parameter δ = 0, 1
2
, 1, in SI, EQ, TI geome-
tries, with associated fixed point values z∗ = 3−d
3+d
, 1
d+1
, 1
2
.
The δ = 1
2
result is expected, the total population dis-
tributed evenly amongst the d + 1 groups. If, however,
the anomalous party distances itself from the rest moving
farther away, this subpopulation grows to a dimension-
independent percentage of 50%, the remaining parties
sharing equally the other half of the population; of
course, for the 2D case we’ve focussed on thus far, this
corresponds to the TI FP (1
4
, 1
4
, 1
2
). Although fluctuations
can permit higher fractions for this dominant party- our
earlier simulations indicated, see Figures 2&4, upwards
of 3/5, there are apparently dynamical constraints that
strongly limit the maximum membership of this favored
party. Should the party in power become too fashionable,
FIG. 5. EQ FP lifetime distributions via decay modes to
SI and TI dynamical states; 750000 realizations.
the seceder mechanism inceases the likelihood of deser-
tion from within. Finally, in the situation where the
stochasticity draws the errant party closer to the oth-
ers, a stable SI FP exists only stable below the upper
critical dimension dc = 3! Consequently, fluctuations in
d ≥ 3 bring about the successive demise of all but three
of the remaining parties, the system suffering cascadal
collapse & dimensional reduction to a 2D ideological hy-
perplane [10].
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